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Non-technical Summary
In the classic case fiscal federalism leads to economic growth by a more productive and
possibly smaller public sector through higher preference homogeneity and enhanced inter-
governmental competition. On the other hand, decentralized political decisions create
inter-jurisdictional spillovers which may negatively affect growth by distorting local tax
and fiscal incentives. In recent years, this discussion has led to a growing body of literature
aimed at understanding the empirical link between the two phenomena. The results on
the existence, direction or sign of such a link, however, are as ambiguous as ever.
The present paper takes a fresh look at the empirical relationship between fiscal
federalism and output growth using a Bayesian model averaging approach. This approach
is increasingly becoming a standard econometric tool in the empirical growth literature,
because it offers a coherent procedure to deal with both model and parameter uncertainty
in a context of weak theoretical guidance which has previously led researchers to choose
their empirical specifications (explanatory variables and functional forms) on an arbitrary
basis, or at best using some unknown rule-of-thumb rules. Surprisingly, however, the
earlier literature on the link between growth and federalism - by definition being a part
of this much larger literature on the determinants of economic growth and, thus, sharing
the same methodological limitations - has never adopted these advancements.
Obviously, endogeneity and causality are the main concerns of these studies, but the
methodological superiority of the present analysis allows for claiming that the results
of previous research might have been additionally biased due to over restrictive model
specification. In contrast, the results from a sample of 23 OECD countries over 1975-2000
indicate that after controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity, there is no robust
link, neither positive, nor negative, between output growth and fiscal federalism.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die o¨konomische Theorie des Fo¨deralismus geht davon aus, dass fiskalischer Fo¨deralis-
mus im klassischen Fall - aufgrund eines dank ho¨herer Pra¨ferenzhomogenita¨t und erweit-
ertem intergouvernementalen Wettbewerb produktiveren und mo¨glicherweise kleineren
o¨ffentlichen Sektor - zu ho¨herem Wirtschaftswachstum fu¨hrt. Jedoch verursachen dezen-
tralisierte politische Entscheidungen Spillover-Effekte u¨ber Gebietsko¨rperschaften hin-
weg, die das Wachstum durch verzerrende Kommunalsteuern und Fiskalanreize beeintra¨ch-
tigen ko¨nnen. In den letzten Jahren hat diese Diskussion mit dem Anliegen, den em-
pirischen Zusammenhang zwischen den beiden Pha¨nomenen zu verstehen, zu einer wach-
senden Literatur gefu¨hrt. Allerdings sind die Ergebnisse u¨ber Existenz, Richtung und
Vorzeichen eines solchen Zusammenhangs widerspru¨chlich.
Die vorliegende Studie verwendet ein Bayesianischen Modell (Bayesian model aver-
aging) und wirft damit einen neuen Blick auf den empirischen Zusammenhang zwischen
fiskalischem Fo¨deralismus und Wirtschaftswachstum. Dieses Verfahren wird zunehmend
zum o¨konometrischen Standard in der empirischen Wachstumsliteratur, denn es bietet
ein koha¨rentes Vorgehen im Umgang mit Modell- und Parameterunsicherheit im Kon-
text schwacher Orientierung durch die Theorie. Dies hat Forscher zuvor dazu veranlasst
empirische Spezifikationen der erkla¨renden Variablen und des funktionalen Zusammen-
hangs auf beliebiger Grundlage oder allenfalls unter Verwendung bloßer Daumenregeln
vorzunehmen. U¨beraschenderweise wurden diese Verbesserungen in fru¨heren Studien
u¨ber den Zusammenhang zwischen Wachstum und Fo¨deralismus - die per Definition einen
Teil der umfangreicheren Literatur u¨ber die Determinanten wirtschaftlichen Wachstums
sind und daher denselben methodologischen Einschra¨nkungen unterliegen - nicht aufge-
griffen.
Die Hauptsorgen dieser Studien gelten ganz offensichtlich der Endogenita¨t und Kausali-
ta¨t, doch kann aufgrund der methodologischen Vorzu¨ge der vorliegenden Studie gesagt
werden, dass die Ergebnisse der bisherigen Forschung durch zu restriktive Modellspezi-
fikationen zusa¨tzlich verzerrt wurden. Demgegenu¨ber weisen die Ergebnisse eines Daten-
satzes, der 23 OECD-La¨nder im Zeitraum von 1975-2000 umfasst, darauf hin, dass es
unter Kontrolle nicht beobachtbarer La¨nderheterogenita¨t keinen stabilen, weder einen
positiven noch einen negativen, Zusammenhang zwischen Wirtschaftswachstum und fiskal-
ischem Fo¨deralismus gibt.
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Following the ambiguous results in the literature aimed at understanding the
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the question using a Bayesian Model Averaging approach. The analysis suggests
that the failure to appropriately account for model uncertainty may have previ-
ously led to biased estimates. The results from a sample of 23 OECD countries
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1 Introduction
A couple of decades ago decentralization used to be a matter of marginal importance
for public economics scholars and for policy makers. Countries were constitutionally
divided into federal or unitary systems and there were hardly any political or economic
initiatives for restructuring. This was the post-World War II period, characterized by
rapid growth in public spending. The resulting large government involvement in the
economy eventually raised concerns over public sector performance and over its further
potential in sustaining permanent economic growth rates. This brought the issue of
optimal allocation of fiscal authority between different government layers to prominence
in the academic and policy debates. Fiscal federalism of course remains a complex multi-
dimensional phenomenon, but an important trade-off that has attracted much academic
attention is whether the growth-stimulating benefits from making decisions at appropriate
levels are outweighed by the costs of duplicating government efforts.
In the classic case fiscal federalism leads to growth by a more productive and possibly
smaller public sector through higher preference homogeneity (Oates, 1972) and enhanced
inter-jurisdictional competition (Tiebout, 1956, Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). On the
other hand decentralized political decisions create inter-jurisdictional spillovers (Mus-
grave, 1959, Oates, 1972) which negatively affect growth by distorting local tax and fiscal
incentives. Less conventional arguments that could go in both directions range from
economies of scale (Prud’homme, 1995, Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010) and macroe-
conomic stability (Ter-Minassian, 1997, Fukasaku and de Mello, 1999, Martinez-Vazquez
and McNab, 2006) to government accountability (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003)
and institutional quality (Ahmad and Tanzi, 2002).
The results of the growing empirical literature on the link between fiscal federalism and
economic growth are at least as diverse.1 The reason behind such inconclusiveness is that
the impact of decentralization on growth has hardly been analyzed in a systematic man-
1See Feld et al. (2009) for a detailed overview followed by a literature meta-analysis, and Feld and
Schnellenbach (2011) for a summary.
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ner (Feld et al., 2009). These papers typically analyze different cross-country samples
with various measures of fiscal federalism and with diverse, often restrictive, method-
ologies. Davoodi and Zou (1998), Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010), Bodman (2011),
Baskaran and Feld (2013) are among those authors who provide evidence for a negative
relation between federalism and growth, while Yilmaz (2000), Iimi (2005) report opposite
results. Woller and Phillips (1998), Thornton (2007) do not find such a robust direct
link. Thiessen (2003) tries to link these results together by arguing that the relation is
inverse-U shaped, while Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) maintain that fiscal feder-
alism can potentially enhance growth, but only conditional on good institutions. Case
studies on federal countries such as Australia (Bodman et al., 2009)2, China (Zhang and
fu Zou, 1998), India (Zhang and fu Zou, 2001), Russia (Desai et al., 2005), Switzerland
(Feld et al., 2005) or the United States (Xie et al., 1999, Akai and Sakata, 2002, Stansel,
2005, Hatfield and Kosec, 2013) again lead to ambiguous results.
According to Breuss and Eller (2004), the uncertain results of empirical papers may
be interpreted as the theoretical trade-off construction that reflects the various gains
and drawbacks of fiscal federalism. We take a different position here. The empirical
estimations have crucial limitations and are not very reliable. In particular, what is
surprising is that the empirical literature on fiscal federalism and growth, by definition
being a part of the much larger literature on the determinants of economic growth (one
of the most prominent early contributions being Barro (1991)), did not sufficiently follow
recent innovations of this larger field. Hence, our aim is to contribute to the understanding
of the empirical link between fiscal federalism and economic growth by adopting the
methodological refinements of growth empiricism.
With the recent exceptions of Brueckner (1999), Brueckner (2006), Rauscher (2007),
Ko¨thenbu¨rger and Lockwood (2010) and Hatfield (2012) theoretical foundations of the
impact of fiscal federalism on economic growth have remained scarce and have, therefore,
limited the legitimacy of previous empirical work. This relative absence of guidance
2Similar to us, Bodman et al. (2009) applies a BMA approach, however using time-series data.
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from economic theory on channels through which fiscal federalism should affect growth
left most researchers to choose their empirical specifications (explanatory variables and
functional forms) on an arbitrary basis, or at best using some unknown rule-of-thumb
rules. The vast amount of literature on the determinants of economic growth, on the other
hand, has identified over 150 (Durlauf et al., 2005) or more variables to have explanatory
power and has accordingly developed new methodological approaches of analyzing such
high amounts of regressors. Ironically, federalism - either fiscal, political, administrative
or of any other dimension - has never had its place among these determinants of economic
growth.
In particular, we closely follow the works of Sala-i Martin (1997), Fernandez et al.
(2001), Sala-i Martin et al. (2004) and others to extend the discussion by applying a
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach which provides a coherent procedure to
account for both model and parameter uncertainty. BMA also considers a very large set
of models by allowing any subset of up to our 25 hypothetical growth determinants to
enter the regressions (this totals to 225 or over 33 million different models to deal with).
Our estimates are based on a sample of 23 OECD countries over the 1975-2000 period,
where fiscal federalism is measured as the share of tax revenues, over which sub-national
governments have the autonomy to fully or partly decide upon tax rates or bases. The
initial cross-country estimates on the determinants of per capita growth find a moderately
negative coefficient for the above measure of fiscal federalism (and for the federation
dummy), but weakly positive coefficients for dummies capturing the existence of locally
elected sub-national parliaments/governments. These results are, however, not robust to
the inclusion of country (and time) fixed effects into the BMA model, suggesting that the
results of previous research might be biased due to over restrictive model specification.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
the data and the analytical framework. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. The
last section 4 concludes and offers several directions for future research.
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2 Data and Methodology
The first challenge of our empirical estimation is to find an accurate measure of the pre-
vailing degree of fiscal federalism. Many of the previous empirical studies use IMF’s Gov-
ernment Finance Statistics (GFS) to quantify fiscal federalism by computing the ratio of
regional-to-total government expenditure and revenue (ExpDCT and RevDCT ). Despite
its merits and popularity, however, concerns are rising over these widely used measures
of fiscal federalism, as they severely overestimate the sub-national fiscal independence by
failing to make an appropriate distinction between sub-national government’s real fiscal
autonomy and its administrative activities tightly regulated by the center. We attempt
to tackle these issues by adopting a dataset constructed by Stegarescu (2005), which sup-
posedly captures the true amount of sub-national fiscal autonomy by differentiating tax
revenue according to the degree of autonomy that the sub-national governments possess
over the associated tax rates and tax bases.
Figure 1 plots the traditional GFS measures of fiscal federalism (ExpDCT and RevDCT )
against the two Stegarescu (2005) measures, defined as revenue autonomy of first degree
- RAut1 - measured as the share of tax revenue over which the sub-national government
has the full autonomy to set the tax rate or base, and a softer revenue autonomy of
second degree - RAut2 - which additionally considers shared tax revenues over which the
central and sub-national authorities jointly co-decide the revenue splitting mechanism.
The Stegarescu (2005) data has clear advantages which, for example, can be observed by
comparing two neighboring, albeit very different, federations of Germany and Switzer-
land. Whereas GFS measures rank them in about the same position in their degrees
of fiscal decentralization, Stegarescu (2005)’s measures allow distinguishing between the
two types of federalisms that have become to be known as cooperative and competi-
tive, respectively. The former is characterized by wide spending responsibilities at the
sub-national level, which, however, are non-discretionary and are financed by a system
of extensive equalization payments. On the contrary, sub-national governments in the
5
Figure 1: Four cross-country measures of Fiscal Federalism, averaged over 1995-2001
Notes: Own calculations based on data from IMF-GFS and Stegarescu (2005).
latter case have one of the highest autonomies in our sample (and in the world) over their
spending and taxing decisions, and are thus competing with each other.3
Figure 2 presents the evolution of fiscal federalism measured by RAut1 for selected
economies. Note that relative to the competing measures of federalism (including the
GFS measures, but also dummies capturing political/administrative features of federal-
ism such as countries proclaimed as federalist by constitution, existence of autonomous
regions, presence of locally elected governments and parliaments etc), considerable cross-
time variance is observed in case of RAut1 and RAut2. Some illustrious examples include
the governments of France, Italy and Spain which significantly shifted their fiscal power
towards lower governmental layers, or Belgium which following a process of reforms be-
came a federal state in 1993 (Belgium has experienced the highest average increase in
sub-national fiscal autonomy in the sample, that equals about 0.8 percentage points per
year). On the opposite, Norway, Switzerland and the UK became more centralized on
average. Still, the majority of countries in the sample did not see significant changes over
time. This includes constitutionally decreed federal countries (which could have been a
3By construction, Stegarescu (2005)’s both measures of revenue autonomy should always be below
the GFS’s measure of RevDCT, which, however, does not hold for the entire sample indicating that the
two datasets are not consistent with each other and, thus, should be treated with care when used jointly.
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Figure 2: Evolution of sub-national government revenue autonomy - RAut1 - over 1975-
2000 for selected OECD economies
Notes: Own calculations based on data from Stegarescu (2005).
source of important variation) such as Germany that stagnated at a low 7% average level,
or the US with 37% of local revenue coming from own sources.
The two measures of fiscal federalism, RAut1 and RAut2, are our main variables of
interest which will be regressed on PPP-adjusted per capita GDP growth rates. The
sample is restricted to 23 OECD countries (listed in Figure 1 and additionally including
Japan and Portugal) where these more reliable measures of federalism are available. The
remaining explanatory variables are borrowed from the large literature on cross-country
growth empirics, which over the last two decades has proposed a long list of variables as
growth determinants. In particular, in addition to the two measures of revenue autonomy,
we include 16 panel variables to capture various macro-economic, political, social and
demographic phenomena and 8 further cross-country variables to account for differences
in initial conditions and in geography. Overall we construct a database of 27 variables for
23 OECD countries from 1975 to 2000: Table 1 presents the summary statistics, sources
and short descriptions of the employed variables.
To formally address the specification uncertainty of analyzing this amount of vari-
ables, we follow the recent advancements in the empirical growth literature and apply
7
an already rather standard BMA approach (see for example Levine and Renelt (1992),
Sala-i Martin (1997), Fernandez et al. (2001), Sala-i Martin et al. (2004), Masanjala and
Papageorgior (2008), Moral-Benito (2012), and Raftery (1995) or Durlauf et al. (2005)
for a discussion on BMA or broader variety of econometric methods employed to study
growth). In particular, we consider a set of linear equations where the GDP growth rate
per country-year is regressed on a constant term and on any subset of up to the 25 hy-
pothetical growth determinants (including measures of fiscal federalism) specified above.
Briefly, the idea is to a priori declare that the “true“ model is unknown, which implies
a departure from the classical methodology in which conditioning on a specified model
is essential. Consequently, instead of traditional conditioning, the employed Bayesian
inference attaches prior non-informative beliefs to the model parameters (i.e. coefficients
and error variance). In the next - averaging - step, the (unconditional) estimator is com-
puted as a weighted average of these conditional estimators. A formal and more detailed
specification of the approach we apply is presented by Magnus et al. (2010).
We add to the above by extending the analysis to a panel dataset. This allows includ-
ing country fixed effects to tackle the issue of unobserved cross-country heterogeneity.
The trade-off, however, is that we are risking to limit our available information to the
inadequately low within-country variation of the fiscal federalism variables.4 Indeed, it
is not uncommon to argue that the underlying features of federalism are mainly con-
stitutional and, so, do not vary much over time. Thus, in the next section we present
estimations using both pooled data to exploit the cross-country constitutional differences
and data demeaned by country (and year) averages to control for unobserved country
characteristics.5
4Baskaran and Feld (2013) present evidence on the within variance of these measures which are then
exploited by applying country fixed effects models.
5Lovell (2008) shows that this approach of demeaning data is equivalent to using fixed effects (we are
constrained of using fixed effects dummies as the inclusion of further variables into the model makes the
analysis computationally prohibitive).
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3 Results
Table 2 presents the BMA estimation results with PPP-adjusted per capita GDP growth
rate as the dependent variable. Model (1) is the baseline specification with pooled data,
and model (2) extends the set of explanatory variables by including cross-country con-
trols for initial conditions and for geographic differences. Model (3) is a variant of the
latter specification but controlling for common time shocks, while models (4) to (6) -
our most reliable specifications - additionally account for unobserved country hetero-
geneity. In models (1) to (4) the fiscal federalism measure entering the regression is the
sub-national governments’ revenue autonomy of first degree (RAut1 ), model (5) uses the
softer measure of revenue autonomy of second degree (RAut2 ), while model (6) tests for
a non-linear relation between growth and federalism. The last two models (7) and (8)
serve as robustness by estimating the time fixed effects model (3) on 5-year averages data
and on annual data excluding the case of Switzerland, respectively.
The first column of each model reports the estimated coefficient, i.e. the weighted
posterior means of the regressors’ coefficients and since it is not straightforward to in-
terpret coefficient estimates that are averaged over many models of different size and
form, we will be mainly interested in their sign (rather than their value). The second
columns report the posterior inclusion probability that is the posterior probability that
a variable is included in the model. As a guideline to compare to frequentist hypothesis
testing, Raftery (1995) and Masanjala and Papageorgior (2008) suggest that a posterior
probability of 50% roughly corresponds to a t-ratio of one in absolute terms. Although
the BMA literature has not reached a consensus regarding a threshold value on the “sig-
nificance” of posterior probabilities, such question does not rise in our estimation as a
fair number of growth determinants clearly appear in the top rows of Table 2 with above
90% probabilities, while the inclusion probabilities of the rest are discontinuously low.
Among these variables the following are positively linked to output growth rates across
models: the share of investment expenditure in GDP - Investment - as one of the central
10
growth generating economic factors; the share of the sum of exports and imports in GDP
- Openness - that reflect the economic benefits of exploiting comparative advantages of
foreign trade and other gains of economic integration; the budget surplus to GDP ratio -
Budget balance - indicating the presence of pro-cyclical central government fiscal policies;
and a measure of territorial size - Log Area - showing scale effects. Unlike the latter,
the remainder of time-invariant variables such as the controls of initial conditions do not
have high posterior inclusion probabilities, perhaps because of the relative homogeneity
of countries in the sample in terms of their income levels. Two monetary variables
Inflation and Lending interest enter the regressions with the expected negative signs.
The standard arguments for lower and more stable inflation rates is the reduced economic
uncertainty and improved efficiency of the price mechanism, while the rate of lending
interest rate is an indicator of healthy financial systems assuming that accessibility to
cheap money positively affects capital accumulation and, thus, contributes to economic
growth. Finally, the share of government consumption in GDP also has a high posterior
inclusion probability, interestingly, indicating a reverse relation to economic growth.
Turning to the central variables of interest, initial cross-country estimates (models 1-2)
find a significantly negative coefficient for the fiscal autonomy indicator - RAut1 - and for
the time-invariant federation dummy - Fed Dummy - but weakly positive coefficients for
dummies capturing the existence of locally elected sub-national parliaments or govern-
ments. These results are maintained when controlling for common time shocks (model
3), however they are not robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects (models 4-6).
Likewise, no such evidence is found for the softer measure of local fiscal autonomyRAut2
(model 5) or for a quadratic relation (model 6) as some scholars suggest.
As discussed earlier, by including country fixed effects we are potentially running into
the risk of limiting the available information on fiscal federalism to within-country vari-
ance that might be too low. A loss of significance could then just mean inadequate
empirical specification rather than absence of such a link. Contrary to this argument,
however, in models (7) and (8) we show that the results of a negative growth-federalism
11
relation are too sensitive to be considered robust. First, the results do not hold in a
5-year averages replication of the time fixed effects model, suggesting that they might
have been driven by short-term business cycle fluctuations. Moreover, the significance of
the sub-national fiscal autonomy variable, as well as of the constitutional fiscal federalism
dummy, almost entirely vanish when we exclude one of the most interesting cases of fed-
eralism - Switzerland - from the sample, which unlike most of the countries in the sample,
has experienced a high within variation in RAut1 during the period considered (it had
the second lowest level of average annual growth in sub-national fiscal autonomy of about
-0.4 percentage points). But given the high possibility of failure in properly accounting
for Switzerland’s unique institutions (even with such an extensive set of controls, but no
country fixed effects), generalization of these results to the whole sample might well be
biased.
Contrary to the findings of many previous empirical studies, which claim significantly
negative or positive relations between growth and fiscal federalism, our analysis suggests
that there is no such robust link. Obviously, endogeneity and causality are the main
concerns of these studies, but the methodological superiority of our analysis allows us to
claim that the results of previous research might have been additionally biased due to
over restrictive model specification. As the contrast between models (1) to (3) on one
side, and models (4) to (6), model (7) and model (8) of Table 2 on the other shows one
particular source of such bias may well be the failure to properly account for cross-country
unobserved heterogeneity.
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4 Conclusion
In the present paper we take a fresh look at the empirical relationship between fiscal fed-
eralism and economic growth using a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approach. BMA
is increasingly becoming a standard econometric tool in the empirical growth literature,
because it offers a coherent procedure to deal with both model and parameter uncertainty
in a context of weak theoretical guidance. Surprisingly, however, the earlier literature on
the link between growth and federalism - by definition being closely linked to the em-
pirical growth literature and, thus, sharing the same methodological shortcomings - has
never adopted these advancements. We aim at covering this gap and show that previous
research which claims to have found a significant, either negative or positive, relation
between growth and fiscal federalism is biased due to over restrictive model specifica-
tion. In contrast, our estimations indicate that after controlling for unobserved country
heterogeneity there is no such direct link.
One particular issue that has largely burdened the legitimacy of the literature on the
link between fiscal federalism and economic performance is the tendency of oversimplify-
ing the relation between the two highly multi-dimensional phenomena by comparing their
aggregated values. As our results underline the importance of country heterogeneity, we
believe that future empirical research should consider the channels through which differ-
ent aspects of federalism influence different facets of the economy in different institutional
settings by paying particular attention to the relevant mechanisms in detail. Other well
known issues such as endogeneity and causality that are common to the growth literature
in general, will of course remain important.
From a policy perspective, the absence of such a direct link implies that at least there
is no trade-off between federalism and growth. This suggests that a careful institutional
design may still allow the realization of many benefits of federalism that originate from,
for example, increased preference homogeneity or through enhanced inter-jurisdictional
competition.
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